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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DALE W. DeMILLE, 
Administrator df the Estate 
of Terry Lee DeMille and 
Constance Hope DeMille, 
also known as Connie DeMille, 
deceased, 
-vs-
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
PHYLLIS ERICKSON, 
Administratrix of the Estate of 
Frederick Kenneth Spendlove, 
deceased, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
11,385 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by Dale W. DeMille 
as Administrator of the Estate of 'Terry DeMille and 
Constance DeMille to recover damages for their al-
leged wrongful death from the defendant, Phyllis 
Erickson, Administratrix of the Estate of Frederick 
Kenneth Spendlove. The action arose out of an auto-
mobile accident which occurred in Iron County on 
the 11th day of August, 1965, in which Terry De-
Mille, Constance Hope DeMille and Frederick Ken-
neth Spendlove were killed. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury before the Honm·. 
able C. Nelson Day in the District Court in and for 
Iron County. At the close of the evidence, both parties 
made motions for directed verdicts. The court ruled 
that the plaintiff could not recover for the wrongful 
death of Terry Lee DeMille on the ground that he 
was negligent as a matter of law in the operation of 
his vehicle at the time and place of the accident in 
question and that his negligence was a contributing 
and proximate cause of his own death. The court de-
nied the motions for directed verdicts in the action 
brought for the alleged wrongful death of Constance 
Hope DeMille. 
The court submitted the case to the jury under 
an instruction (Instruction 24), which contained 
five separate issues of negligence on the part of Fred· 
erick Kenneth Spendlove, the driver of the other auto-
mobile: that he failed to maintain a proper lookout; 
failed to keep the car under reasonably safe and prop· 
er control; failed to drive as nearly as practical en· 
tirely within a single lane and not to move from one 
lane to another; failed to keep his automobile on his 
own right side of the highway; and failed to turn his 
vehicle to the outside of the highway to avoid a col· 
lision. Appellant objected to this instruction on the 
grounds there was no evidence of negligence on the 
part of Frederick Kenneth Spendlove and that in the 
absence of such evidence he was entitled to a pre· 
sumption that he was using due care. The jury re· 
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solved the issues in favor of the plaintiff and render-
ed a judgment in the amount of $23,000.00 which 
was entered by the court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant, Phyllis Erickson, Administratrix of 
the Estate of Frederick Kenneth Spendlove, seeks a 
reversal of the judgment entered in the lower court 
or in the alternative a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this case indicate that the deceaseds, 
Terry Lee DeMille and Constance Hope DeMille, 
were husband and wife (TR. 6). They resided in 
Cedar City, Utah (TR. 8). Approximately one week 
prior to the accident, Terry had been laid off from his 
work at the Webster Coal Company. On the day of 
the accident, August 11, 1965, he was on his way to 
see about a job in Las Vegas, Nevada (TR. 13). 
Terry and his wife were seen at a service station in 
Cedar City the morning of the accident between 6 :30 
and 6:40 a.m. (TR. 15). At that time Terry was sit-
ting in the driver's seat of a Chevrolet automobile 
and his wife was in the front seat on the right side 
(TR. 16). They were next seen at the scene of the 
accident just south of Kanarraville, Utah, or approx-
imately 13or14 miles south of Cedar City (TR. 17). 
At 6 :55 a.m. Officer William R. Burch of the 
Utah Highway Patrol received a call reporting an 
automobile accident jus't south of Kanarraville, Utah. 
He immediately drove to the scene of the accident, 
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arriving at 7 :05 a.m. He was the first officer to ar. 
rive on the scene which was about a mile south of 
Kanarraville, Utah, on Highway 91. This was the 
highway in normal use between points to the south of 
Cedar City. At the time the freeway had not been 
opened to the public (TR. 24) . He first checked the 
people who had been involved in the accident and 
identified a 1962 Volkswagen. There were two people 
lying near this vehicle later identified as Frederick 
Kenneth Spendlove and a Mr. Condie. Both in his 
opinion were dead (TR. 25) . He then identified a 
Chevrolet automobile in which there was a man and 
woman, later identified as Terry DeMille and his 
wife Constance DeMille (TR. 26). In his opinion 
Terry DeMille was still breathing at the time but ex-
pired shortly thereafter (TR. 26). He called for as-
sistance and an ambulance and then proceeded to 
make his investigation which can best be understood 
by referring to Exhibits No. 5 and 6, which we have 
reproduced and which appear on the following pages 
of this brief. Exhibit 5 is a diagram of the scene of 
the accident and Exhibit 6 is a photograph of the 
same area. 
The highway extends in a generally north and 
south direction. The overall width of the highway 
was 31 feet (TR. 27). It was marked by a dotted 
or dashed white line down the approximate center of 
the highway. The distance from the center of the 
highway to the east edge of the highway was 16 feet 
4 inches (TR. 29). There was a solid yellow line in 
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the south bond lane of traffic west of the dotted or 
dashed white line (TR. 30). The Volkswagen auto-
mobile ended up off of the east side of the road in the 
position illustrated as point No. 3 on Exhibit 5 and 6. 
To the north of these vehicles various skid marks, 
scrapes and gouges felt to be of critical importance 
in reconstructing the accident were found. The far-
thest mark north in the north bound lane of traffic 
was a rubber scuff mark about 20 inches in diameter. 
The outside edge of this mark was 60 inches east of 
the white line. The center of this mark was 49 inches 
east of the white line (TR. 32, 33). 
Between the mark identified as point No. 1 and 
the white line down the center of the highway there 
were a number of gouge marks. One of these, the one 
that is closest to the center line, was identified on 
Exhibits 5 and 6 as point No. 6. This mark was ap-
p1·oximately 18 inches south of the mark found at 
point No. 1 (TR. 93) and approximately 2Y2 inches 
east of the white line (TR. 54). This mark in the 
opinion of Officer Burch was made by some metal 
part of the Volkswagen, probably the left front wheel 
(TR. 93). In the opinion of Officer Reed it was made 
by the collapsation of the undercarriage of the front 
left of the Volkswagen (TR. 169) which would in-
clude the axles, shock absorbers, and the wheels (TR. 
in, 17 4). Approximately 105 inches south of point 
No. l a rubber skid mark was found leading diagon-
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ally off to the east side of the road to the final resting 
place of the Volkswagen (TR. 36, 37) which came to 
rest at the point illustrated on Exhibits 5 and 6 as 
point No. 3. This mark in the opinion of Officer 
Burch was made by one of 'the rear tires of the Volks-
wagen prior to the time it left the road (TR. 85). On 
the east edge of the highway near point No. 3 there 
were scuff or tire marks made by the underpart of 
the Volkswagen automobile as it left the highway 
('TR. 137). Further sou'th and beginning at what has 
been shown as point No. 7 on Exhibit 5 and leading to 
the right front of the Chevrolet automobile which 
has been shown as point No. 8 on Exhibit 5 there was 
a mark extending in a circular fashion ('TR. 7 4). To 
the south of this mark being at a point identified as 
point No. 4 on Exhibits 5 and 6 and leading to the 
Chevrolet automobile which has been identified as 
point No. 5, there were two rubber skid marks which 
begin near the center of the road (TR. 45) and lead 
up to the Chevrolet (TR. 40). All of the marks found 
by the officers were on the east side of the highway 
with the exception of the marks running from point 
No. 2 to 3 which start on the west side near the center 
of the road (TR. 76). There is an oil slick in the vi-
cinity of point No. 6 which the officers said had noth· 
ing to do with this accident (TR. 78). There appear 
to be some blotches or blotchy areas on the west side 
of the highway which according to the officers do not 
tie in or have anything to do with this accident (TR. 
78). 
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A car going south from Cedar City would be on 
the west side of the highway and a car going north 
or towards Cedar City would be on the east side of 
the highway (TR. 76). The front end of the Chev-
rolet automobile was extensively damaged (see plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 12 and defendant's Exhibit No. 3). 
The front of the Volkswagen automobile was practic-
ally obliterated (see plaintiff's Exhibit No. 11). The 
point of maximum engagement on the front of the 
Chevrolet automobile was from a little bit right of 
the center of the automobile to the left side of the car 
(TR. 95) , an area of approximately four feet in 
length (TR. 96). 
The area where the impact between the two 
automobiles occurred was identified on Exhibit 5 by 
the red circle drawn in the area which was previously 
identified as point No. 6. Actually point No. 6 is in 
the opinion of Officer Reed, one of the investigating 
officers, anywhere from six inches to two feet from 
the point where the automobiles first came together. 
Other than the foregoing physical facts, there is no 
evidence in the record as to what the drivers of the 
two vehicles were doing at the time of the accident, 
whether they saw one another, the speed at which 
they were driving, what evasive action they may or 
may not have taken prior to the accident, or any other 
informa!tion as to how the accident in this case may 
have occurred. 
Based on these physical facts and the inference 
that the DeMille car was travelling south, since it 
7 
was travelling away from Cedar City, the two high-
way patrolmen who testified in the case, William R. 
Burch and Robert J. Reed, both of whom were called 
by the plainltiff, attempted to reconstruct the acci-
dent and arrived at certain conclusions. Based on the 
gouge marks, the area designated as the point of im-
pact, the damage to the front end of the Volkswagen, 
and the damage to the front end of the Chevrole1t auto-
mobile, Officer Burch testified that in his opinion the 
DeMille or Chevrolet automobile was about three to 
four feet across the white line into the north bound 
lane of traffic at the time of the impact (TR. 97). 
He further testified that the 1962 Volkswagen auto-
mobile had an overall width from one side to 'the other 
of sixty inches and a width from the outside of the 
tire on the right to the outside of the tire on the left 
df 56 inches (TR. 54), so that on each side beyond 
the outer rim of the tire there would be two inches to 
the outside skirt of the car. The 1962 Volkswagen 
weighed approximately 1800 pounds. The Chevrolet 
automobile had an overall weight of between 3,500 
and 4,000 pounds. He further testified that on the 
basis of the physical evidence which he found at the 
scene of the accident, the Volkswagen automobile 
would be 21;2 inches east of the center of the white 
line (TR. 90) and that he found no evidence what-
soever indicating that the Volkwagen or Spendlove 
vehicle ever got on to the wrong side of the road. He 
stated that as the two automobiles came together the 
left side of the Chevrolet automobile came up over 
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the Volkwagen. At that point the rear of the Chev-
rolet automobile swung in a counter-clockwise direc-
tion to the west side of the road and continued on 
around until it came to the point indicated as point 
No. 4 where the rear wheels engaged the highway. At 
this point the front of the Chevrolet automobile starts 
to swing in a clockwise direction, the right front 
wheel of the car engaging the highway at point No. 7 
and making the marks shown on the exhibits between 
poinlt No. 7 and No. 8, the vehicle coming to rest with 
the front end again facing toward the south (TR. 
101). At the same time the front end of the Volks-
wagen was forced down onto the highway making the 
marks shown on Exhibits 5 and 6 as points 1 and 6. 
At that point 1the front end of the Volkswagen was 
facing toward the center of the road. The rear of the 
Volkswagen then moved in a counter-clockwise direc-
tion towards the east, the north, the west, and back 
to the south making almost a 180° circle to where the 
rear of the Volkswagen engaged the road at point No. 
2 on Exhibit 5 and 6 (TR. 180, 101, 108). At that 
point the rear wheels of the automobile, and the 
Volkswagen skidded around in a clockwise direction 
making the scuff marks on the edge of the road in 
the area near point No. 3 and came to rest with the 
front of the Volkswagen pointing in a southeast di-
rection at point No. 3 (TR. 127 through 129). 
One of the contentions of the plaintiff is that the 
mark shown at point No. 2 which is one foot seven 
inches onto the west side of the road was made by the 
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Volkswagen automobile at the time of impact an<l 
illustrates that it was on the wrong side of the road 
at that time and that this mark was made by the rear 
of the Volkswagen automobile as it was simply push-
ed off of the road. Referring to the mark leading 
from point No. 2 to 3 (TR. 133), the officer was ask-
ed: 
"Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Now, counsel has asked you, could this 
have been made by the car being pushed 
sideways off the road, and your answer 
to that is yes, it could have been so made, 
possibility? 
Yes. 
But that is not your opinion as to how it 
was made? 
A. No." (TR. 134) 
And again on page 135 of the transcript the officer 
was asked: 
"Q. Let me ask you this, in the realm of pos· 
sibilities: Assume that this tire was left-
well, let me put it this way, assume that 
when the car was forced to the ground, 
one wheel was there (indicating) and one 
wheel was there, (indicating) is there 
any possibility, then, that that car, that 
the left rear of that car could have made 
that tire mark as it went off the road; if 
we assume we started with the car hitting 
the ground, the wheels hitting the ground 
in that position (indicating) anil then 
being forced off the road, is there any pos· 
sibility that that mark could have b.een 
made by the left rear wheels of the tires 
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when it was forced off the road? 
A. No." 
Both officers concurred in their analysis of how 
the Volkswagen swung around first to the east, then 
the north, west, and then south in a counter-clockwise 
direction (TR. 101, 180). 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIRECT 
A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT 
It has already been shown that there was no evi-
dence produced at the trial relative to the acts and 
conduct of the deceased, Frederick Kenneth Spend-
love, immediately before the collision. Except for the 
fact that Terry Lee DeMille and Constance DeMille 
were seen in Cedar City fifteen to twenty minutes 
prior to the accident and were then intending to go 
to Las Vegas, Nevada, nothing is known concerning 
the events leading up to the collision. All of the per-
sons involved in the collision were killed, and there 
were no eye witnesses. 
Where there are no eye witnesses or other evi-
dence of negligence on the part of the deceased, the 
general rule is stated in Blashfield Automobile Law 
And Practice, Section 417.2, Volume 11, as follows: 
"In the absence of any evidence as to the con-
duct of deceased, in most jurisdictions, in view 
of the instinct of self-preservation, there is a 
presumption that the deceased, whether an 
adult or a minor, was in the exercise of ordin-
ary care at the time of an automobile accident. 
This includes the presumption of due obser-
11 
vance of deceased of the traffic laws. The pre-
sumption is that the deceased did what a pru-
dent man would have done under the circum-
stances until the accident occurred." 
The rule that in the absence of evidence to the con-
trary it would be presumed that a deceased person 
was exercising due care has been dealt with by this 
Court in several cases: Tuttle vs. PIE, 242 Pac. 2d 
764, 121 U 418, 121 U 420; Gibbs vs. Blue Cab, 249 
Pac. 2d 213, 122 U 312; Mecham vs. Allen, 262 Pac. 
2d 285, 1 U 2d 79; Okuda vs. Rose, 5 Utah 2d 39, 296 
Pac. 2d 287. 
We conceive the doctrine of those cases to be that 
a deceased person is presumed to be in the exercise of 
due care (the presumed fact), which presumption 
arises from the fact that he has been killed (the basic 
fact) . The presumed fact remains in the case until 
the party who has the burden of proving the non· 
existence of the presumed fact produces prima facie 
evidence to the contrary. If that burden is not dis· 
charged, the presumed fact remains in the case and 
the court should instruct the jury on it or direct a 
verdict in accordance with that presumption. 
In the Mecham case, supra, Justice Wade ex· 
plains the effect of the presumption as follows: 
"Such a presumption deals only with the bur· 
den of going forward with or the production of 
evidence. The question of whether a prill!a 
f acie case has been made is the same here as Ill 
all other cases - a question for the court and 
not the jury to determine. It is established 
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whenever sufficient evidence is produced from 
which its existence could be reasonably found. 
Of course it is immaterial which party pro-
duces such evidence. If the court concludes 
that a prima facie case has been made it should 
submit the question of the existence of the pre-
sumed fact to the jury on the evidence without 
commenting on or mentioning to them that 
there was or is such a presumption. If the court 
concludes that no prima facie showing of the 
non-existence of the presumed facts has been 
made he should direct the jury to assume the 
existence of the presumed facts, or if such 
facts are determinative of the whole case he 
should direct a verdict in accordance there-
with." 
Actually as was pointed out in Okuda vs. Rose, 
supra, this is simply to say that the person who 
charges negligence on the part of another has the 
burden of proving such negligence by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. In the Okuda case the question 
was whether or not the plaintiff who was deceased 
was guilty of contributory negligence and an instruc-
tion on the presumption that she was exercising due 
care was not given. The court said: 
"As to the first point on appeal plaintiffs were 
not entitled to instruction that the decedent 
was presumed to be acting with due care for 
her own safety. The trial court instructed that 
the defendant had the burden of proving his 
affirmative assertion of contributory negli-
gence by a preponderance of the evidence, and 
it has been indicated that there is no need to 
give an instruction to emphasize the burden of 
going forward with the evidence where def en-
13 
dan t also has the burden of persuasion as 
here." 
The courts have formulated the rule that negli-
gence is never to be presumed but must be established, 
and until established by competent evidence the jury 
has no function to perform, Goheen vs. Graber, 309 
Pac. 2d 636 (Kansas). It has also been held that it 
is not within the jury's province to indulge in mere 
speculation or conjecture with respect to the issue of 
negligence, and a verdict cannot be predicted on mere 
speculation or conjecture respecting the vital issue, 
Modelin vs. Consumers Coop Association, 241 Pac. 
2d 693 (Kansas). The case particularly in point is 
Aagard vs. Dayton & Miller Red-E-Mix Concrete 
Company, 12 Utah 2d 34, 361 Pac. 2d 582. In this 
case the facts were as stated in the case: 
~'Plaintiff's sheep truck was traveling wester-
ly down the canyon; and defendant's cement 
truck was traveling easterly up it, although 
the road from both direc'tions is slightly down-
grade approaching the underpass. Plaintiff's 
driver, Clifford Bloomquist, testified that as 
he neared the underpass he saw the cement 
truck coming about 200 feet away, astride the 
center line, but that as it came on it appeared 
to be moving back toward its side of the high-
way; while the defendant, Thomas Cook, driv-
er of the cement truck, admits that the sheep 
truck appeared to be on its own side when he 
first observed it, and does not claim to have 
seen it over the center line. He said he realized 
the trucks were going to be close as they passed 
but did not expect any collision. 
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"The trucks were not afoul each other as their 
front portions passed. The defendant's rear 
view mirror, which extends just beyond the 
width of the cement truck on the driver's side, 
was not touched. But the trucks apparently 
came closer together as they continued passing 
each other because from about half way back 
the paint on the cement truck was scraped by 
the rack of the sheep truck." 
The case was tried to the court without a jury, 
who rendered a judgment for defendant. The plain-
tiff appealed attacking the findings of judgment as 
being against the evidence. The court held : 
"Even if the plaintiff is correct in arguing 
that certain aspects of the evidence tend to 
favor his claim that his driver was in the right, 
that is not enough to justify upsetting the 
judgment. As plaintiff he had the burden of 
proving his right to recover by a preponder-
ance of the evidence." 
There is an annotation on the sufficiency of evi-
dence, in the absence of survivors or of eye witnesses 
competent to testify, as to the place or point of impact 
of motor vehicles going in opposite directions and in-
volved in a collision in 77 ALR 2d at page 576. A re-
view of the annotation discloses that such evidence in 
and of itself has been held sufficient to sustain aver-
dict in some cases and insufficient in other cases. A 
reading of those cases will illustrate that all the 
courts agree that there must be sufficient circum-
stantial evidence to support a verdict and that each 
case can be distinguished by the physical evidence 
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found in that particular case. For the reason that in 
none of those cases is the physical evidence the same 
as in this case, we see no point in burdening the court 
with an analysis of each particular case. The rule by 
which the evidence should be measured is set out in 
Bokhoven vs. Hull, 1956, 247 Iowa 604, 75 N.W. 2d 
225, cited on page 582 of the annotation, where it was 
held: 
"That circumstantial evidence need not be so 
clear as to exclude every possibility other than 
'the one relied upon, but must be clear enough 
to make that theory more reasonably probable 
than any other hypothesis based on the evi-
dence." 
In the case which we are considering there is no 
evidence other than the damage to the vehicles, the 
highway itself, and the marks found upon the high-
way. All of the marks found on the highway are on 
the defendant's side of the road with the exception 
of the mark made by the rear wheel of the Volks· 
wagen automobile which begins one foot seven inches 
to the west of the white line and then extends across 
the whi'te line onto the east side of the road and off 
to where the Volkswagen came to rest. Plaintiff will 
probably claim that that mark alone is sufficient evi· 
dence upon which to base a verdict, contending that 
that mark was made by the Volkswagen at the mo· 
ment of impact as the Volkswagen was pushed off of 
the highway by the Chevrolet automobile. An analysis 
of all the marks on the highway and the physical dam· 
age to both of the automobiles will show that the ' 
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Volkswagen automobile could not possibly have made 
the mark on the highway found at points 1 and 6 and 
have made the mark running from point 2 to 3 at the 
same time. Both of the police officers who were called 
by the plaintiff and who have some degree of expert-
ness in investigating accidents were of the opinion 
that the marks at point 1 and point 6 of the diagram 
(Exhibit 5) and the photograph (Exhibit 6) were 
made by the Volkswagen automobile as it was forced 
onto the pavement at the time of impact, and that the 
mark found at point 2 and running to point 3 was 
made by the Volkswagen automobile after the impact 
and after the Volkswagen automobile had swung 
around in a 180 ° circle where the back wheels came to 
rest upon the pavement. No one except plain'tiff's at-
torney ever hypothecated that the mark found at 
point 2 and extending to point 3 was made at the time 
of impact. So it is seen under the tests which we have 
previously set out that the plaintiff's theory of caus-
ation is not the more reasonably probable but in the 
opinion of one of the investigating officers consider-
ing all of the physical evidence is impossible. 
The opinion of the only officer who was ever 
asked the question as to whether or not the Volkswa-
gen automobile got onto the wrong side of the road 
was that it did not. What we then have is an impact 
between two automobiles which it appears were trav-
eling in opposite directions, which occurred near 'the 
white line down the center of the highway. The Chev-
1·0Iet or DeMille automobile at that point was 3% to 
17 
4 feet onto the wrong side of the road. The Spendlove 
or Volkswagen automobile was at the least two inches 
from the center of the white line onto its own side of 
the road. From this the only inference that can be 
made is that Terry DeMille was partially onto the 
wrong side of the road a't the time of the accident and 
that this was a proximate cause of the collision. It 
cannot be presumed from this evidence alone that 
either of the vehicles were traveling in excess of the 
speed limit or at an unreasonably high rate of speed. 
It cannot be presumed from this evidence that they 
should have seen one another in time to avoid the ac-
cident. It cannot be inferred from this evidence that 
they had a reasonable opportunity to take some eva-
sive action to avoid the accident. As will be illustrated 
further on in our argument, both parties could have 
been observing a proper lookout, driving at area-
sonable rate of speed with their cars under reason-
able control, and this accident nevertheless have hap-
pened. It, therefore, appears that there was simply 
no competent evidence on which the lower court could 
submit the question of negligence on the part of Fred-
erick Kenneth Spendlove to the jury since there was 
no evidence from which a jury could infer negligence 
on his part. 
That the court committed further error in the 
manner in which it submitted this case to the jury is 
the substance of Point II. of the argument of this 
brief. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUC-
TION NO. 24 PERTAINING TO NEGLIGENCE 
As pointed out in our argument under Point I, 
the only established fact in this case relative to the 
conduct of the drivers of the vehicles is that the col-
lision between the two vehicles occurred at or near 
the white line down the highway on Spendlove's side 
of the road. The court nevertheless gave its Instruc-
tion No. 24 pertaining to negligence on the part of the 
defendant to which the defendant duly accepted (TR. 
253). Said instruction reads as follows: 
"Instruction No. 24 
"It was the duty of the decedent Freder-
ick Kenneth Spendlove to use reasonable care 
under the circumstances in driving his car to 
avoid danger to himself and o'thers and to ob-
serve and be aware of the condition of the high-
way, the traffic thereon, and other existing 
conditions; in that regard, he was obligated: 
'"A. To use reasonable care to keep a look-
out for other vehicles and obstacles or other 
conditions reasonably to be anticipated. 
"B. To keep his car under reasonably safe 
and proper control. 
"C. Upon a laned highway to drive as 
nearly as practicable entirely within a single 
lane and not to move from one lane to another 
until the driver has first ascertained that he 
can do so with reasonable safety. 
"D. To drive his automobile on his own 
right side that is, the east side of the highway. 
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"E. To keep a lookout for persons and 
other vehicles upon the highway, and when-
ever it appears to be reasonably necessary in 
the exercise of due care for the safety of him-
self or others, to turn his vehicle to the outside 
of the highway to avoid a collision. 
"Failure of the said Frederick Kenneth 
Spendlove to operate his automobile in accord-
ance with the foregoing requirements of the 
law would constitute negligence on his part." 
Under this Instruction the jury were at liberty 
to find negligence on the part of Frederick Kenneth 
Spendlove on any one or more of five grounds: First, 
they might return a verdict against his estate if he 
failed to maintain a proper lookout; second, if he 
failed to keep his car under reasonably safe and prop-
er control (whatever that means) ; third, if they 
found he was traveling upon a laned highway (which 
he was not) and did not drive as nearly as practicable 
entirely within a single lane and did move from one 
lane to another without first ascertaining that he 
could do so with reasonable safety; fourth, that he 
drove his automobile onto the wrong side of the road; 
and fifth, that he failed to turn his vehicle to the out-
side of a highway to avoid a collision. The jury could 
have easily have been sufficiently impressed with the 
instruction to believe that there was evidence in the 
record from which they could find that Frederick 
Kenneth Spendlove was negligent in one or more of 
the ways mentioned. They would be entitled to as-
sume that there must have been evidence in the record 
or the court would not have given the instruction. It 
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is for these reasons that courts have declared that 
such abstractions constitute reversible error. 
See Corpus Juris Secundum, Trial, Section 379, 
Volume 88. 
"Instructions should be concrete and specific 
as possible with respect to the facts and issues 
of the case, and not general or abstract, and it 
is improper to give an instruction announcing 
a naked legal proposition, however correct it 
may be, unless it bears on, and is connected 
with the issues involved, and unless, further 
there has been some competent evidence to 
which the jury may apply it." 
This statement of law is further developed in suc-
ceeding sections in that volume and is supported by 
many cases. 
In Hadley vs. Wood, 345 Pac. 2d 197, 9 Utah 2d 
336, an action for personal injuries sustained by the 
plaintiff when a sleigh upon which he was riding slid 
into the path of defendant's automobile, this court 
said: 
'''In the second place an instruction may be en-
tirely accurate as a general statement of law 
and yet be erroneous if applied to special fact 
situations ... It is not the function of the court 
to recite to the jury propositions of law in the 
abstract, however accurate or even interesting 
they may be. It is worse than idle to do so. By 
including irrelevancies the process could go on 
interminably with the result not only of boring 
but likely of confusing the jury. It seems hard-
ly necessary to reiterate the idea also included 
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in the preface to JIFU, ' ... the fewer instruc-
tions given, the better ... no instruction should 
be given unless it is both necessary and appli-
cable to the fact situation at hand'." 
It is also well settled that the court may not per-
mit the jury to speculate upon the evidence and that 
a finding of fact cannot be based upon surmise, con-
jecture, guess or speculation, Jackson vs. Colston, 
116 Utah 205, 209 Pac. 2d 566; Dern Investment 
Company vs. Carbon County Land Company, 94 
Utah 76, 75 Pac. 2d 660. 
The general proposition that it is prejudicial 
error for a trial court to give instructions on matters 
extraneous to the issues and evidence of the case not-
withstanding that such instructions may correctly 
state the law has been stated in numerous cases by 
this court. In that connection see Shields vs. Utah 
Light and Traction Company, 99 Utah 307, 105 Pac. 
2d 347; Parker vs. Bamberger, 100 Utah 361, 116 
Pac. 2d 425; Morrison vs. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 
Pac. 2d 772; Corey vs. Southern Pacific Company, 
119 Utah 1, 223 Pac. 2d 819; Olson vs. Warwod, 123 
Utah 111, 225 Pac. 2d 725; Moore vs. Denver and Rio 
Grande Western Railroad, 292 Pac. 2d 849, 4 Utah 
2d 255; and Johnson vs. Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 268, 
342 Pac. 2d 984. 
In the case of Morrison vs. Perry, supra, the de· 
fendant was driving from Deweyville which is on the 
highway north of Ogden to Ogden. As they approach· 
ed the scene of the accident about 7 :00 o'clock a.m. 
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it was light and visibility was good and defendant 
was proceeding at 35 to 40 miles per hour. As his 
car approached the point where the main and old 
highway separate, he saw the deceased's car ap-
proaching from the south on the main highway but 
could not tell on which side of the road he was until 
they were within 225 feet of each other at which time 
they noticed the deceased was on the wrong side of 
the highway on the inside of a curve headed toward 
the right side of defendant's automobile. The defen-
dant immediately swung his car to the left and ap-
plied his brakes. At the same instant the deceased 
swung his car to the right. Defendant's car had al-
most come to a stop when the collision occurred near 
the edge of the hard surf ace of the old highway on de-
fendant's left hand side and near the point of diver-
gence of the highways. Both cars were travelling at 
about the same rate of speed. The complaint was 
made of the instructions and the trial court said, on 
page 776 of the Pacific Reporter: 
~'·The trial court instructed a jury on all the 
alleged grounds of negligence set forth in 
plaintiff's complaint. One of the grounds was 
that the defendant drove his car 'without hav-
ing it under immediate control, so he could 
stop it within the range of his vision.' The 
court should not have submitted this issue to 
the jury where there was no evidence to sup-
port it and it was not applicable in this case." 
In the case of Johnson vs. Maynard, supra, it 
was held in an action for injuries suffered by the 
plaintiff when her automobile was struck by an of-
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ficial police vehicle, driven by the defendant, in an 
intersection in the downtown business area that in 
the absence of a showing ( 1) that plaintiff had been 
aware of particular dangers involved in approach 
of defendant's vehicle and (2) that, having such 
knowledge, she had nevertheless assumed the risk of 
such danger and proceeded, had rendered the doctrine 
of assumption of risk inapplicable; and held that er-
ror in instructing on that doctrine would require re-
versal, since jury could have believed from instruction 
that plaintiff would be barred from recovery by as-
sumption of risk even if she had exercised due care 
under the circumstances. 
In the case of Shields vs. Utah Light and Trac-
tion Company, supra, the court read the pleadings to 
the jury as part of the instructions. In sub-paragraph 
9 of the instruction the jury was advised (by way of 
setting forth just what plaintiff contended the facts 
showed) that at the time of his death (as a result of 
the action in question) "He was an employee of the 
Tooele Valley Railway Company in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and was earning a salary of $77.50 a month 
and was promised by said employer, and upon said 
promises it is therefore alleges that his salary would 
rapidly increase until he would be earning approxi-
mately $200.00 per month." The court held: 
"We conclude that the reading of the long and 
involved Complaint to the jury as part of the 
charge was error not altogether corrected by 
the mere admonition that the foregoing is not 
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to be considered as evidence but merely sets 
forth the claims of the plaintiff. Likewise, set-
ting forth the plaintiff's theory in Instruction 
1, that the deceased would soon have been earn-
ing $200.00 per month, was error for the rea-
son that there was no evidence offered to sup-
port such allegation." 
For the jury to find in this case that Frederick 
Kenneth Spendlove was not keeping a proper lookout 
prior to the time of the collision, the jury would have 
to assume that the DeMille automobile drove down 
the highway on the wrong side of the road or in a 
manner otherwise constituting a threat to Kenneth 
Spendlove for a sufficient length of time for Fred-
erick Kenneth Spendlove to have seen the vehicle and 
appraise the situation, and then to have done some-
thing about it. For the jury to have found that Spend-
love was negligent for failing to turn his vehicle to 
the outside of the highway to avoid a collision as-
sumes first of all that he saw the car or should have 
seen the car approaching him on the wrong side of 
the highway for a sufficient length of time to have 
done something about it, but also that that car was 
during that period of time approaching in such a 
manner as to have made a turn to the outside of the 
highway advisable. The charge that Frederick Ken-
neth Spendlove may have been negligent if he failed 
to keep his car under reasonably safe and proper con-
trol presumes that he had an opportunity to avoid the 
accident and could have avoided it had his car been 
under reasonably safe and proper control. We have 
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already pointed out that there was no evidence that 
Spendlove drove his car on the wrong side of the road i 
which would make this part of the instruction inap-1 
plicable. It is much more probable, unless we want to 
assume the drivers wanted to commit suicide, that 
the DeMille automobile came over onto the wrong 
side of the highway suddenly - perhaps he turned 
out to pass a car or some such thing - and there was 
nothing either driver could do at that point. The point 
we are trying to make is illustrated by the case of 
Baumler vs. Hazelwood (Texas, 1961) 347 S.W. 2d 
560. This was a wrongful death action arising out of 
a head-on collision on an open highway. In the words 
of the court: 
"The accident occurred about 1 :30 a.m. 
on Sunday morning. The night was clear and 
bright. There was a moon. The highway, U.S. 
Highway 77, was a concrete two-lane highway 
with a white line painted down the center and 
clearly visible. At the point of collision, the 
highway was smooth, straight, and level. There 
were gravel shoulders 6 or 8 feet wide leading 
into ditches on both sides of the highway. The 
highway runs north and south. 
''Baumler was driving north from Dallas 
in the east lane of the highway. Hazelwood, ~c­
companied by a female companion, was dr1v· 
ing in the opposite direction, i.e., south toward 
Dallas. Their cars collided, left-front. fen~er 
to left front fender. Hazelwood was killed ind· 
stantly. The lady accompanying Hazelwoo 
did not take the witness stand. While Baumler 
was permitted to testify about other matters, 
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he was not permitted to testify as to the colli-
sion itself. The testimony was excluded by the 
trial judge because of the provisions of the 
Dead Man's Statute; i.e., that the accident was 
a 'transaction with the deceased' under Article 
3716, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes Annotat-
ed. 'The correctness of this ruling is not before 
us. There were no other eyewitnesses. So the 
evidence before us consists mainly of the condi-
tion of the cars, condition and acts of the par-
ties before and after the collision, pictures tak-
en at the scene, and the evidence left after the 
crash. 
" ... The jury found that Hazelwood fail-
ed to keep a proper lookout and failed to have 
his car under proper control, both of which 
were negligence and a proximate cause of the 
collision. It found that Hazelwood did not fail 
to turn his car to the right immediately before 
the collision; but it found that immediately 
prior to the collision, Hazelwood drove and 
operated his car so that a portion thereof ex-
tended to his left-hand side of the center stripe 
of the highway; and this was negligence and a 
proximate cause. Those findings are not at-
tacked. 
"The jury found that Baumler did not fail 
to keep a proper lookout; did not fail to keep 
his car under proper control; and did not drive 
or operate his car on his left-hand side of the 
center line. It found, however, that he was 
driving his car at a greater rate of speed than 
a person of ordinary care and prudence would 
have driven under the circumstances; and that 
this was a proximate cause of the collision. It 
also found that Baumler failed to turn his car 
to the right immediately before the collision; 
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and that this was negligence and a proximate 
cause. 
" ... As set out above, the jury found that 
Hazelwood drove his car over into Baumler's 
side of the road. It also found that Baumler did 
not drive on the wrong side of the road. But 
there is no evidence as to how far the two cars 
were apart when Hazelwood drove onto Baum-
ler's side, and there was no direct evidence of I 
the speed at which the cars were approaching 1 
each other. We find no evidence that, includ-
ing reaction time, Baumler had any opportun-
ity to take evasive action by turning, speeding 
up, or slowing down. The testimony regarding 
skid marks or the lack of them need not be re-
peated except to observe this: there were none 
according to the testimony of the sheriff's pa-
trolman and other witnesses. There were tire 
marks 'just before the point of impact' accord-
ing to Roy Perry. And while Billy Gober said 
that he did not remember well, he recalled 15 
or 20 feet of marks on the east and about 10 
feet on the west. Gober did not describe the 
direction of the skid marks, except that they 
were on one side or the other of the highway. 
For that matter he did not testify who made 
the skid marks. 
" ... Under this evidence the jury would 
have to speculate on the time and distance .fac-
tors. We find no evidence thereon. The JUl'Y 
found that Baumler kept a proper lookout and 
had his car under proper control. If, then, 
Hazelwood suddenly drove onto Baumler's 
side of the road and there was no time for 
Baumler to evade him, Baumler would have 
been hit, and he would have hit Hazelwood, at 
whatever speed Baumler was traveling." 
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Instruction 24 is erroneous in yet another re-
gard, and that is that the charge that Frederick 
Kenneth Spendlove had a duty "upon a laned high-
way to drive as nearly as practicable entirely within 
a single lane and not to move from one lane to another 
until the driver has first ascertained that he can do 
so with reasonable safety" was not applicable unless 
we consider this a laned highway. If we did consider 
it a laned highway, then the charge that Frederick 
Kenneth Spendlove had a duty to "drive his automo-
bile on his own right side that is, the east side of the 
highway" was not necessary. The instruction is con-
fusing and therefore prejudicial in that it implies 
that Kenneth Spendlove might have driven his auto-
mobile on his own right side of the highway and not 
be negligent under paragraph D of the instruction 
and yet in some manner be negligent under para-
graph C. It is not surprising that the jury returned 
a verdict in the plaintiff's favor in the action brought 
for the death of Connie Spendlove. Having been in-
structed as they were in Instruction 24 in spite of 
the lack of evidence of negligence on the part of Ken-
neth Spendlove given a choice of five ways in which 
they might find Spendlove negligent would have re-
quired a great deal of astuteness on their part to de-
termine that at least four of the charges of negligence 
did not pertain to and had nothing to do with this 
accident. For the reasons given, we feel the court com-
mitted prejudicial error in giving Instruction No. 24 
especially when that instruction was immediately 
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followed by Instruction No. 24 (A) which incorpor- I 
ated 24 and said: 
"Before you can return a verdict for the I 
plaintiff because of the death of Connie De- I 
Mille, you must find by a preponderance of the I 
eyi.dence that each of the following two propo- I 
s1 tions are true : 
"A. That the defendant's decedent Mr. 
Spendlove was negligent in the operation of 
the automobile he was driving at the time and 
place of the said collision in one or more of the 
particulars as mentioned herein above. 
~'B. That such negligence of Mr. Spend-
love, if any, was the proximate cause of said 
collision. 
"In this connection you are instructed 
that plaintiff has the burden of proving each 
of the above and foregoing propositions by 
such preponderance of the evidence." 
CONCLUSION 
All of the persons involved in this accident were 
killed. There was no evidence as to how the accident 
had occurred except that it is known that the De· 
Milles were on their way to Las Vegas, the damage 
to the two automobiles in question, and the physical 
marks left on the highway at or after the point of 
impact. On the basis of this evidence it is reasonable 1 
to inf er that this was a head-on collision between the I 
DeMille vehicle, which was traveling south, and the 
Spendlove vehicle, which would have to be traveling 
north, and that the accident occurred by reason of the 
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fact that the DeMille vehicle was 31/2 to 4 feet onto 
the wrong side of the road at the time of impact. 
There is no evidence whatsoever as to what happened 
up to the time of impact. There is no evidence that 
Frederick Kenneth Spendlove ever drove his automo-
bile onto the wrong side of the highway. There is 
no evidence that the drivers were traveling at an ex-
cessive rate of speed; did not have their automobiles 
under control; or that Frederick Kenneth Spendlove 
could have avoided the accident by turning his auto-
mobile to the right. Under such circumstances it was 
error on the part of the court to deny the appellant's 
motion for a directed verdict. The plaintiff had failed 
to sustain his burden of proving negligence on the 
part of Frederick Kenneth Spendlove, who being 
dead is presumed to have been exercising due care, 
by a preponderance of the evidence. Nevertheless, 
the court submitted the case to the jury specifying 
five grounds of negligence. Under that instruction 
: the jury were asked to speculate as to whether or not 
Frederick Kenneth Spendlove was keeping a reason-
able lookout, keeping his car under reasonable con-
trol, driving on the wrong side of the road, or could 
have turned to the right and avoided the accident. 
There being no evidence in the case from which such 
inferences could be made, it was error on the part of 
the trial court to so instruct the jury. Since the plain-
tiff did fail to sustain his burden of proof as to negli-
gence on the part of Frederick Kenneth Spendlove, 
the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and 
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i 
judgment entered in the appellant's favor. The leas( :1 
which this court should do in order to correct this , 
manifest miscarriage of justice is to grant appellant 1 
a new trial. '1 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
By Don J. Hanson 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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